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David M. Schultz1 and Randolph C. Arnau1
Abstract
This study examined effects of a mindfulness induction on proximal and distal defense
responses to mortality salience and negative affect. Three experimental conditions
were included: mindfulness, mind-wandering, and worrying. Participants in the
mindfulness condition underwent a mindfulness induction at the experiment’s
outset, while participants in the other two conditions underwent a mind-wandering
or worry induction. Inductions involved following guided audio instructions
presented via headphones. All conditions (N¼ 77) underwent a mortality salience
induction after experimental manipulation, involving a written exercise pertaining to
one’s death. Results indicated fewer proximal responses in the mindfulness and mind-
wandering groups, compared with the worrying group, but no differences in distal
responses. Negative affect was lower in the mindfulness group than in the worrying
group following mortality salience. Results suggest that mindfulness exercises effect-
ively buffer against negative affect and some responses to mortality salience, although
these effects are not different from those of mind-wandering.
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Terror Management Theory (TMT)
TMT postulates that existential anxiety resulting from knowledge of one’s inevi-
table death is unique to humans (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986).
More importantly, TMT posits that the behavioral effects of the conscious
awareness of one’s mortality, or mortality salience, occur across multiple
domains, including psychopathology, legal decision-making, sexuality, religious
behavior (Kesebir, 2014, p.611), and romantic attachment style (Coolsen &
Nelson, 2002). Cognitive and behavioral reactions to mortality salience can
vary widely, with many individuals reporting extreme anxiety and distress
when confronted with the thought of their own death (Kesebir, 2014).
Although the existence of emotional and behavioral responses to mortality
salience is well-documented (Kesebir, 2014; Niemiec et al., 2010, Sliter, Sinclair,
Yuan, & Mohr, 2014), relatively little research has investigated ways to intervene
against the negative effects of mortality salience. A series of nine studies by
Gailliot, Schmeichel, and Baumeister (2006) established that emotional self-
regulation moderates the degree to which individuals experience death-related
anxiety in response to a mortality salience induction. It therefore stands to
reason that mindfulness may be an effective tool in attenuating defensiveness
toward thoughts of mortality because of its inherent means of increasing
psychological flexibility and emotional self-regulation.
To date, only one series of published studies directly examined mindfulness
and mortality salience (Kesebir, 2014). This series of studies (Niemiec et al.,
2010; Sliter et al., 2014) examined the topic from the perspective of trait mind-
fulness, but no study has yet attempted an experimental intervention to buffer
against responses to mortality salience. Thus, this was the purpose of the present
study. Specifically, the present study examined the effects that a mindfulness
induction (compared with a mind-wandering and worry induction conditions)
had on proximal and distal defense responses and negative affect, when admi-
nistered just prior to a mortality salience induction.
Emotional responses to mortality salience may be especially distressing to
vulnerable populations who may consistently have death-related thoughts—for
example, suicidal or depressed individuals, individuals with chronic or terminal
illness, or those nearing the end of the natural life span. As such, the psycholo-
gical literature would benefit from experimental research specifically investigat-
ing means of buffering against the negative aspects of mortality salience as a
means of decreasing negative emotionality in vulnerable populations and
improving overall quality of life.
In TMT literature, a sense of personal value that defends against death-
related anxiety is referred to as self-esteem. Self-esteem comprises possessing a
firmly held belief in two factors: First, that one possesses a worldview that is
superior to all opposing worldviews or is at least valid and internally consistent
to the individual; and second, that one meets the standards of behavior espoused
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by that worldview (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997). For most individuals, this
worldview is provided by the culture with which the individual identifies.
Of particular interest to researchers are what are referred to as proximal and
distal defense mechanisms exhibited in subjects who are prompted to be con-
sciously aware of their own mortality. Proximal defense mechanisms typically
refer to conscious attempts to suppress or ignore mortality-related thoughts,
whereas distal defense mechanisms are conceptualized as alterations in behavior
which are relatively indirect or unconscious in nature. Proximal defense mechan-
isms are relatively easy to define: In general, any behavior which consciously
attempts to escape thoughts of death and the affective discomfort brought by
these thoughts may be considered a proximal defense mechanism. Conversely,
the term ‘‘distal defense mechanism’’ refers to a more abstract category of
behaviors undertaken in an effort to reassure the individual that their worldview,
ideals, and surrounding environment are consistent with their approach to
behavior. The tendency for mortality salient individuals to hand out harsher
punishments to hypothetical criminals, for example, is considered a distal
defense mechanism because this behavior theoretically represents an uncon-
scious or symbolic attempt by the individual to purge their environment of
forces which may pose a threat to their safety, worldview, or society. By
doing so, the individual maintains a sense of certainty and security which
would otherwise be threatened by mortality salience generated by the threat
of criminal activity. Proximal and distal defense mechanisms are often observed
as a proxy means of measuring death anxiety in laboratory settings.
It has been established that increased mortality salience can arouse distress,
anxiety, and sadness (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Florian & Mikulincer,
1997; Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Kesebir, 2014).
Psychological defense responses to these emotions have been well-documented in
the literature. A meta-analysis by Burke et al. (2010) found that, on average,
across 277 experiments, mortality salience yielded moderate effects (r¼ .35) on
various indices of defensive responses, such as increased aggression toward
others who violate their worldview, more negative responses to those who
violate their moral beliefs (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997), and a higher likelihood
of bias and favoritism toward those who support their worldview compared with
those who have not undergone mortality salience induction (Greenberg et al.,
1992; Niemiec et al., 2010). All these reactions to mortality salience, from the
perspective of TMT, are considered to function as defenses against the uncom-
fortable emotions elicited by mortality salience.
Proximal and distal defense responses can be measured in a variety of ways.
Proximal defense mechanisms typically refer to active suppression of death or
mortality-related thoughts. Previous research has examined proximal defense
responses in the contexts of suppression of death thoughts, denial of vulnerabil-
ity to terminal disease or premature death (Niemiec et al., 2010), as well as
positive cognitive and behavioral changes such as increased intention to exercise
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(Arndt, Schimel, & Goldenberg, 2003) and use sunscreen (Routledge, Arndt, &
Goldenberg, 2004). Conversely, distal defense mechanisms are conceptualized as
more unconscious or symbolic in nature than proximal defense responses. Distal
defense responses are more closely related to threats to self-esteem or worldview
than to explicit death-related thoughts.
Mindfulness and Acceptance
Scientific interest in mindfulness has drastically expanded in the last few decades
(Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007), particularly in clinical psychology and related
fields. Mindfulness-based interventions have shown efficacy in a vast number of
contexts, including stress reduction (Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach,
2004) and treatment of depression, anxiety, sexual disorders, eating disorders,
drug dependence, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and chronic pain
(Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009). A three-point definition offered by Kabat-
Zinn (1994, p. 4) defines mindfulness as ‘‘paying attention in a particular way: on
purpose in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally.’’ The three components of
mindfulness postulated in Kabat-Zinn’s definition—purposefulness, focus on the
present moment, and a nonjudgmental attitude—appear as common threads
throughout most definitions of mindfulness.
Mindful individuals are able to view their own thoughts, pleasant or unplea-
sant, as simply thoughts and are thus able to emotionally respond to them in
a more objective and less threatened manner (Brown et al., 2007). In other
words, mindfulness allows the individual to process difficult thoughts and feel-
ings in a more objective and regulated manner. By viewing difficult feelings
through the lens of mindfulness, individuals are better equipped to analyze
difficult thoughts and feelings without the emotional charge that accompanies
fear or anxiety.
Individuals who are practiced in mindful thinking tend to possess a greater
control over the focus of their attention, allowing them to focus on particular
aspects of reality or ‘‘zoom out’’ to view the broader context in which phenom-
ena exist (Brown et al., 2007). This skill, when practiced, leads to increased
psychological flexibility, which is associated with the ability to adapt to varying
situations, adapt cognitions to fit social contexts or needs, view one’s own beha-
viors objectively, and compare one’s own behaviors to one’s values (Kashdan &
Rottenberg, 2010).
Some research suggests that the state of mindfulness can be briefly heightened
in laboratory settings. Arch and Craske (2006) successfully heightened mind-
fulness in undergraduate subjects who underwent a 10-minute mindfulness
induction compared with subjects who did not. Individuals who underwent
the induction went on to show heightened emotional regulation and distress
tolerance when exposed to extremely unpleasant visual stimuli later in
316 OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying 79(3)
the experiment. Although mindfulness also improves over time with practice,
this study indicates that a mindful state can be briefly induced in the laboratory
even with individuals that are new to mindfulness practice.
If mindfulness is associated with greater psychological flexibility, emotional
regulation, and distress tolerance, it stands to reason that a mindful and accept-
ing attitude toward death-related cognitions may assuage anxiety or other nega-
tive affect associated with mortality salience. By altering one’s cognitions about
death through mindfulness, one may experience lessened distress when con-
fronted with thoughts of death.
As a consequence of this lessened negative affect when presented with mor-
tality salience, one may reasonably predict that that such would in turn be
associated with decreased defensive responses to mortality salience. Thus, in
the present study, it was predicted that mortality salient individuals in a mindful
state would exhibit fewer proximal and distal defensive responses toward
thoughts of death than individuals who were not in a mindful state.
Method
Participants
To be eligible for participation in the study, participants were required to be 18
years or older, may not have been treated or used psychotropic medication for
mental disorders in the last 2 years, and must had have no previous experience in
mindfulness or meditation techniques. These eligibility criteria were adapted
from Arch and Craske (2006). Potentially eligible students were screened
through online survey software and, if eligible, scheduled a time to complete
the study in the laboratory setting. A convenience sample of 77 participants was
obtained for the experiment. Participants were college students who volunteered
to participate in exchange for either required or extra credit for a general psy-
chology course and selected other psychology courses. A cafeteria model is used,
in which psychology students log onto an online study scheduling system and
choose from a variety of online and laboratory-based psychology studies.
Required or extra credit is awarded in accordance with the amount of time
and effort involved with a study.
After screening for eligibility, a total of 77 participants completed the experi-
ment. Participants were undergraduate students at The University of Southern
Mississippi, recruited through an online subject pool, who received course credit
for participation.
The final sample was 80.5% female and 40.3% White, 54.5% Black/African-
American, 1.3% Asian/Asian-American, and 3.9% multiracial. Approximately
62.4% of the participants were in their first or second year of college. Participant
ages ranged from 18 to 46, with a mean age of 20.7 (SD¼ 4.80).
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Materials
Word fragment task. To operationalize proximal defense mechanisms, participants
completed a set of 25 word fragments (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 1997; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994) con-
taining a blank space into which letters could be written. Eight of these word
fragments could be completed with either a neutral or death-related word (e.g.,
KI__ED can be completed with the neutral words [KISSED, KICKED] or with
a death-related word [KILLED]). The fragments which could not be filled with
death-related words served as filler items to prevent participants from guessing
the purpose of the fragment task. This task, adapted from methods used by
Niemiec et al. (2010), measured death-thought accessibility and was treated as
a proxy for proximal defense responses. Proximal defense responses were scored
by counting how many word fragments were completed with a death-related
word, with a higher number indicative of a more defensive response. The
number of death-related words written by each participant was summed, with
their final score on the measure equaling the number of death-related words
written. These scores were then compared across conditions during statistical
analysis.
Multidimensional Social Transgression Scale (MSTS). Distal defense mechanisms were
operationalized using an adaptation of the MSTS developed by Florian and
Mikulincer (1997). The scale consists of 20 short vignettes written in the style
of a newspaper report. Each vignette describes a major calamity befalling an
undeserving victim due to the moral or social transgression of another. Each
vignette describes either intrapersonal or interpersonal consequences for the
victim. Interpersonal consequences involve extreme damage to one’s social
standing, family, or friends as a result of the offender’s transgression (e.g., a
man’s social reputation is ruined after falsely testing positive for HIV under the
care of an incompetent doctor). Conversely, intrapersonal consequences involve
direct damage to the victim, typically in the form of physical or mental harm
(e.g., a doctor mixes up the records of two patients and amputates the leg of the
wrong one). The original MSTS was written for use in Israel, with many of the
original vignettes referring specifically to Israeli culture. For example, one vign-
ette refers to a ‘‘kibbutz’’ with the implicit assumption that the participant will
know what the word means. For the present study, all culturally specific vign-
ettes were removed, reducing the number of vignettes to 10. This also mimicked
the MSTS as it was used by Niemiec et al. (2010).
After reading a given vignette, the participant rated the severity of the trans-
gression as well as the severity of punishment appropriate for the perpetrator,
both on a 7-point scale. Distal defense response was scored by summing both
‘‘severity of transgression’’ and ‘‘severity of punishment’’ scores for all 10 vign-
ettes to create a single, composite score.
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MSTS subscale scores were computed for each of the following four domains:
evaluations of (a) severity of personal offenses, (b) severity of punishment for
personal offenses, (c) severity of interpersonal offenses, and (d) severity of pun-
ishment for interpersonal offenses. Final scores for each participant were derived
by reverse coding responses as necessary and then summing their numeric rat-
ings for each vignette as a composite score. Composite scores were compared
across conditions during statistical analysis.
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) was administered at multiple time points to measure state nega-
tive affect. With a Cronbach’s a coefficient of .84 to .87 and test–retest correla-
tions of .39 to .71 for the Negative Affect subscale (Watson et al., 1988), the
PANAS demonstrates strong validity and reliability with regard to general posi-
tive and negative affect. Different instruction sets can be used to assess either
state or trait affectivity. The instruction set which asks participants to rate how
they feel ‘‘right now’’ was used for the current study, which directed test takers
to rate emotions as they are experiencing them at that very moment. Scores are
derived by reverse coding items as necessary, then summing participants’ ratings
of all items to arrive at a composite score which was compared across groups
during statistical analysis.
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS). Trait mindfulness was assessed using the
PHLMS (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008). The
PHLMS is a bidimensional measure developed to assess two key components
of mindfulness via two independent subscales: Present-Moment Awareness and
Acceptance (Cardaciotto et al., 2008). The scale consists of two 10-item sub-
scales measuring awareness and acceptance, respectively. Each item is rated on a
5-point Likert-type scale (1¼ never, 5¼ very often) according to the frequency
with which they experienced the described item over the past week (Cardaciotto
et al., 2008). Both the Awareness subscale and Acceptance subscale demon-
strated good internal consistency in a sample of 204 nonclinical undergraduates,
with Cronbach’s a coefficient of .81 and .85, respectively. The scale has demon-
strated convergent, discriminant, concurrent, and predictive validity across both
clinical and normal undergraduate populations (Quaglia, Brown, Lindsay,
Creswell, & Goodman, 2015). Scores were derived by reverse coding items as
necessary and then summing the numeric ratings of all items on the scale to
arrive at a composite score for each participant. Composite scores were com-
pared across groups during statistical analysis.
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scales (KIMS). A second measure of trait mind-
fulness was in addition to the PHLMS. The KIMS (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004)
is a 39-item self-report measure in which each item is rated on a 5-point Likert-
type scale (1¼ never or very rarely true, 5¼ almost always or always true)
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according to the extent to which the participant endorses a given trait. The scale
has demonstrated high content validity, as well as adequate to good internal
consistency, with a coefficients ranging from .76 to .91 across four factors,
measuring observation, describing, acting with awareness, and acting without
judgment. As on the PHLMS, scores were derived by reverse coding items as
necessary and then summing the numeric ratings of all items on the scale to
arrive at a composite score for each participant, which were compared across
groups during statistical analysis.
Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale—Revised (CAMS-R). A third measure of trait
mindfulness was used. The CAMS-R (Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, &
Laurenceau, 2007) is a 12-item self-report measure in which each item is rated
on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1¼ rarely/not at all, 4¼ almost always) according
to how often a given item applies to the respondent. The measure has demon-
strated an acceptable Cronbach’s a of .74 to .77 and shows evidence of con-
vergent and discriminant validity. As on the PHLMS and KIMS, scores were
derived by reverse coding items as necessary, then summing participants’
numeric ratings of each item to arrive at a composite score which was compared
across groups during statistical analysis.
Procedure
All data were collected between September and December of 2015. The experi-
ment was conducted in a laboratory at The University of Southern Mississippi.
Participants sat at a desk with a laptop computer which was used to complete
questionnaires and all experimental procedures, including auditory presentation
of instructions constituting the experimental manipulations. The experimenter
left the room during the experimental manipulations. Completion of all ques-
tionnaires, including those administered before and after the experimental
manipulations, took approximately 30 to 40 minutes. Audio instructions
presented during each experimental manipulation lasted approximately 9 min-
utes. A mortality salience induction administered to all participants lasted
approximately 5 minutes. In total, the full duration of the experiment typically
took between 45 and 60 minutes.
After providing informed consent, participants completed the PANAS in
order to establish an affect baseline, along with the PHLMS, KIMS, and
CAMS-R. Afterward, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three
conditions: mindfulness, worrying, and mind-wandering. The worrying condi-
tion was included to mimic ruminative and catastrophic thinking that may result
from distressing thoughts, while the mind-wandering condition acted as a
neutral condition in which the participant idly distracts themselves from perse-
verating on a given thought for more than a minute or so at a time. In the
mindfulness condition, participants underwent a brief mindfulness induction
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by following recorded instructions. The recorded instructions were taken from a
guided meditation used by neuroscientist Sam Harris (2013). The meditation
exercise directed the participant’s attention to breathing and immediate bodily
sensations, instructing the participant to simply maintain an awareness of their
sensory experience rather than trying to control it (e.g., by controlling one’s rate
of inhalation/exhalation). This method is derived from Vipassana meditation
and is designed specifically to cultivate mindful attention and awareness. In
the worrying condition, participants listened to a 10-minute audio recording
in which they were instructed to imagine their current worries or concerns
across a variety of domains (relationships, personal achievement, health, and
personal safety). Participants were instructed to imagine the outcome of the
worst-case scenario that could possibly result from each of these concerns and
consider the likelihood of each worry occurring in reality. This catastrophizing
technique was adapted from methods used by Vasey and Borkovec (1992). In the
mind-wandering condition, participants were instructed to allow their mind to
wander aimlessly, with instructions to continue to allow their mind to wander
repeated approximately once per minute. Each manipulation lasted approxi-
mately 10 minutes and recorded instructions for all manipulations were pre-
sented via headphones. After the experimental manipulation, all participants
were asked to rate how closely they attempted to follow the instructions pre-
sented by each manipulation on a 7-point Likert-type scale.
After the randomly assigned experimental manipulation, all participants
underwent a mortality salience induction using the procedure described by
Niemiec et al. (2010). Participants were asked to ‘‘Briefly describe the emotions
that the thought of your own death arouses in you . . . Jot down, specifically as
you can, what you think will happen to you as you die and once you are dead.’’
(Niemiec et al., 2010, p. 347). Next, participants completed the PANAS a second
time, followed by the MSTS and the word fragment task to assess distal and
proximal defense responses. Participants then completed the PANAS a third
time and were given the opportunity to ask questions about the study before
leaving. No noteworthy difficulties in completing any portion of the study were
noted in any of the participants. The vast majority of participants completed all
items in a prompt manner and relatively few participants posed any questions
regarding the study when given the opportunity. A visual summary of the
experimental procedure is depicted in Figure 1.
Results
Statistical Analysis
Analysis began with computation of correlations between trait mindfulness and
the three dependent variables to assess for potential covariates to be used in the
subsequent analyses. Trait mindfulness scales which correlated with a dependent

































variable were entered as covariates in analyses utilizing that variable alone. A
one-way multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was used to assess
for effects of experimental condition on negative affect, while a series of follow-
up analysis of covariance’s (ANCOVA) were used to examine each isolated time
point identified as significant in the MANCOVA. An ANCOVA was used to
assess for effects of condition on number of death-related words completed
during the word fragment task. An analysis of variance was used to measure
effects of condition on responses to the MSTS.
Correlations of Trait Mindfulness With Dependent Variables
Correlations were used to examine the relation between trait mindfulness, as
measured by the three trait mindfulness scales and the three main dependent
variables (negative affect at Time 1 and Time 2, number of death-related words
written during the word fragment task, and MSTS score). These correlations are
presented in Table 1.
As seen in Table 1, a significant negative relation was found between the
CAMS-R total score and negative affect at Time 2 (immediately after the mor-
tality salience induction), r(75)¼.351, p¼ .002, and Time 3 (at the end of the
study), r(73)¼.331, p¼ .004. A significant negative relation was also found
between the KIMS and number of death-related words written during the word
fragment task, r(62)¼.348, p¼ .005. A positive relation was found between
perceived severity of personal offenses and both the KIMS, r(59)¼ .289,
p¼ .024, and the PHLMS, r(68)¼ .300, p¼ .012.
Because there was a significant negative relation between mindfulness
(CAMS-R) and negative affect after the mortality salience induction as well as
Table 1. Intercorrelations for Three Trait Mindfulness Measures and Seven Dependent
Variables.
Measure PHLMS KIMS CAMS-R
1. Death-related words .139 .348** .193
2. Interpersonal offense severity .173 .215 .139
3. Interpersonal punishment severity .087 .160 .009
4. Intrapersonal offense severity .300* .289* .229
5. Intrapersonal punishment severity .188 .230 .178
6. Negative affect Time 2 .111 .040 .351**
7. Negative affect Time 3 .101 .060 .331**
Note. PHLMS¼ Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale; KIMS¼Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scales; CAMS-
R¼Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale—Revised.
*p< .05. **p< .01.
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at the end of the experiment, CAMS-R scores were entered as a covariate in
subsequent analyses when negative affect was the dependent variable.
Baseline Negative Affect
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to confirm that baseline negative affect did
not differ across the three experimental conditions. No significant main effect
was present, F(2, 73)¼ .787, p¼ .459, indicating that all three experimental
groups possessed equivalent baseline levels of negative affect.
Participant Effort
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess for differences across experimental
conditions on participant ratings of how closely they attempted to follow the
instructions presented in each experimental manipulation. No significant differ-
ences were found between the mindfulness, (M¼ 5.57, SD¼ 1.16), mind-wan-
dering (M¼ 6.07, SD¼ .874), and worrying (M¼ 5.69, SD¼ 1.09) conditions,
F(2, 73)¼ 1.66, p¼ 1.99, indicating that all three groups were equally effortful in
following the presented instructions during the experimental manipulation. This
indicates that a moderately high level of effort was made by all three groups.
Effect of Experimental Condition on Negative Affect
A one-way MANCOVA was conducted to assess the effect of experimental
condition (mindfulness, mind-wandering, and worrying) on PANAS negative
affect scores at Times 2 and 3 with trait mindfulness (CAMS-R) entered as a
covariate. A significant multivariate effect was observed, Wilks’ ¼ .857, F(4,
138)¼ 2.679, p¼ .030, partial Z2¼ .074. The results of the MANCOVA and
follow-up ANCOVA’s are presented in Table 2.
Given the significant multivariate effect, univariate ANCOVA’s were used as
a follow-up to the MANCOVA, with trait mindfulness (CAMS-R) entered as a
covariate, examining the effect of experimental condition on negative affect at
each of the three time points separately. A significant effect was found at Time 2,
F(2, 69)¼ 5.825, p¼ .005, but not at Time 3, indicating significant differences in
negative affect between at least two experimental conditions at Time 2 (directly
after the mortality salience induction). Post hoc comparisons for the Time 2
analysis using Fisher’s LSD indicated significantly less negative affect in the
mindfulness condition than in the worrying condition at Time 2, with a mean
difference of 4.71, p¼ .003 (see Figure 2), but no significant difference between
the mindfulness and mind-wandering condition was found.
A follow-up repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine whether
participants in the mindfulness condition experienced a decrease in negative
affect over the course of the experiment. No significant change in negative
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Figure 2. Negative affect across experimental conditions at Times 1, 2, and 3.
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Analyses of Variance for the Effects of
Mindfulness, Mind-Wandering, and Worrying Conditions on Nine Dependent Variables.
Mindfulness Mind-Wandering Worrying
Variable M SD M SD M SD F p
Partial
Z2
Negative affect Time 1 14.00 5.28 16.11 7.65 13.96 4.97 .978 .381 .028
Negative affect Time 2 13.09 3.50 15.89 5.24 18.46 6.57 5.825 .005 .144
Negative affect Time 3 12.36 3.19 13.96 5.42 14.92 4.73 1.574 .215 .044
Number of death-related words 2.26 .991 2.26 1.287 2.95 .921 4.613 .014 .135
Interpersonal transgression severity 43.16 2.99 43.13 4.24 44.67 5.16 .972 .384 .029
Interpersonal transgression
punishment
42.63 3.61 42.88 4.64 43.25 5.33 .097 .907 .003
Intrapersonal transgression severity 43.16 4.03 42.08 4.79 43.87 4.78 .927 .401 .028
Intrapersonal transgression
punishment
40.26 4.92 40.83 5.09 41.25 5.43 .193 .825 .006
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affect was found between any of the three time points for individuals in the
mindfulness condition, F(2, 42)¼ 2.26, p¼ .11.
Effect of Experimental Condition on Number of Death-Related
Words Completed
A follow-up ANCOVA was also conducted to examine the effect of experimental
condition on number of death-related word fragments completed on the frag-
ment task, with KIMS scores entered as a covariate. A significant effect was
found, F(2, 59)¼ 4.613, p¼ .014. Post hoc comparisons using Fisher’s LSD
assessed specific differences between each of the three experimental conditions.
Post hoc comparisons indicated fewer death-related words completed for the
mindfulness condition (M¼ 2.26, SD¼ .99) compared with the worrying condi-
tion (M¼ 2.95, SD¼ .921), a mean difference of .78 that was statistically sig-
nificant (p¼ .017). Pairwise comparisons also indicated more death-related
words completed in the mind-wandering condition (M¼ 2.26, SD¼ 1.28)
compared with the worrying condition, with a mean difference of .85 that was
statistically significant (p¼ .007). No significant difference in the number of
completed word fragments was found between the mindfulness and mind-wan-
dering conditions (see Figure 3).
Effect of Experimental Condition on Response to Moral Transgression
A follow-up ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of experimental
condition on participants’ responses to the MSTS. Experimental condition
was not found to have a significant effect on participants’ responses when simul-
taneously separating scores across both severity and punishment as well as
across interpersonal versus intrapersonal transgressions.
Discussion
The present study sought to investigate whether a brief mindfulness induction
would buffer defensive responses to mortality salience. Specifically, defensive
responses to mortality salience for those who underwent a mindfulness induction
were compared with those who underwent either a mind-wandering or worry
induction. Negative responses were measured in three ways: proximal defense
mechanisms, as measured by a word fragment task in which a higher number of
death-related words completed implied a more defensive response; distal defense
mechanisms, in which higher ratings of offense severity and deserved punish-
ment on the MSTS implied a more defensive response; and negative affect, as
measured by the PANAS. Individuals in the worrying condition expressed more
proximal defense responses than individuals in the mindfulness and mind-
wandering conditions who did not differ. Likewise, participants in the worrying
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condition endorsed higher levels of negative affect after the mortality salience
induction than did individuals in the mindfulness or mind-wandering condition
who did not differ. No significant group differences were found for measures of
distal defensive responses.
Partial support was found for the hypothesis that individuals in the mind-
fulness group would complete fewer death-related word fragments relative to
other groups. Although participants in the mindfulness group completed signif-
icantly fewer death-related word fragments than those in the worrying group,
there was no statistically significant difference between the mindfulness and
mind-wandering groups. The most that can be concluded is that both the mind-
fulness and mind-wandering conditions were more effective than active worrying
when confronted with mortality salience. Given that the mind-wandering con-
dition was essentially neutral in terms of emotional manipulation, it is possible
that this effect reflects an enhancement of death-related anxiety as a result of
active worrying rather than an indication that either mind-wandering or mind-
fulness produced a buffering effect.
No support was found for the hypothesis that individuals in the mindfulness
condition would endorse less severe punishments toward the hypothetical
antagonists of the MSTS and would interpret the moral transgressions described
Figure 3. Mean completed word fragments across experimental conditions.
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in the MSTS as less severe in nature. No differences were found between any of
the three groups when comparing their respective scores on this measure.
It is unclear as to why mindfulness was found to be more effective at reducing
proximal defense responses and negative affect compared with worrying but had
no significant effect on distal defense responses. However, some consideration
must be given to the fact that studies utilizing the MSTS are sparse, and further
studies probably should be conducted using the measure before to better deter-
mine if it is appropriate as a measure of distal defense responses to mortality
salience. Furthermore, Niemiec et al. (2010) found that the MSTS only yielded
significant differences in response patterns between a mortality salience condi-
tion and a control condition when comparing individuals with below average
trait mindfulness. Accordingly, no difference in response patterns was found in
individuals with high trait mindfulness. Thus, it may be worthwhile to consider
the possibility that scores on the MSTS may be more sensitive to influence from
trait mindfulness as a broader personality trait than to a brief experimental
manipulation intended to increase state mindfulness. However, both the
PHLMS and KIMS measures of trait mindfulness were significantly negatively
correlated with intrapersonal offense severity as measured by the MSTS, and
thus opposite direction than would be expected. Furthermore, Niemiec et al.
(2010) found that MSTS scores only differed between individuals who had and
had not been exposed to a mortality salience induction when such individuals
scored low (1 SD) on trait mindfulness. Conversely, Niemiec et al. found no
difference in MSTS scores in individuals with high trait mindfulness (þ1 SD)
regardless of whether or not they had undergone a mortality salience induction.
It is also worth reiterating that the MSTS was originally constructed for and
tested with a sample of Israeli undergraduate students and that the number and
content of questions used in the original Florian and Mikulincer’s (1997) study
differs from the measure as used by Niemiec et al. (2010) and in the present
study, given that some items that were culturally irrelevant to the current study’s
sample were deleted. Thus, the form of the MSTS as used in the present study
may not be functioning or have the same degree of validity as in previous
studies.
Partial support was found for the hypothesis that under mortality salience,
individuals in the mindfulness condition would report lower levels of negative
affect relative to the other conditions. Mindfulness was found to be more effec-
tive than worrying in diminishing negative responses to mortality salience but
was not significantly different from mind-wandering. With this in mind, an
examination of the separation between negative affect scores across conditions
at Time 2 does allow for the possibility of a noteworthy division between
the three conditions that was not detected due to lack of statistical power (see
Figure 2). It is hypothesized that, given a larger sample size, this pattern would
hold and achieve statistical significance. Along the same line of thought, it is not
out of the question to hypothesize that a larger sample size would yield
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significant results when assessing whether the mindfulness induction resulted in a
steady decrease in negative affect from baseline to termination of the study.
Based on a post hoc power analysis, and assuming the current effect sizes
hold, approximately 81 participants would be needed in both the mindfulness
and mind-wandering groups for the Time 2 negative affect differences across the
groups to be statistically significant.
Nonetheless, the present study has yielded insufficient evidence to conclude
that a brief mindfulness exercise is superior to simple distraction for buffering
the negative defensive responses to mortality salience. Rather than saying that
mindfulness produces a more positive effect than mind-wandering, the most that
can be confidently said is that worrying produces a more negative effect than the
other two alternatives. At least three potential explanations exist for this out-
come: The first possibility is that a brief mindfulness exercise, when applied by
an untrained individual, is simply insufficient at yielding a sufficient level of state
mindfulness to buffer the negative effects more than for simply mind-wandering,
which could be seen as a type of distraction.
Second, the motivation of the participants in the mindfulness condition must
be taken into account. Some degree of concentrated attention is required to
utilize mindfulness skills, whereas no effort or skill is necessary to engage fully
in the mind-wandering condition. This is noteworthy given that the participants
had little incentive to fully pay attention or follow the instructions in the study.
With this in mind, most participants in the mindfulness condition reported a
relatively high degree of effort in following the instructions presented in the
mindfulness meditation exercise. A possible consideration is that, regardless of
one’s motivation, self-inducing a mindful state is a skill that requires sustained
practice over time. A participant’s effort in following the instructions presented
may not reflect their actual success in doing so. It is therefore possible that a
stronger effect would be seen in the mindfulness group after a sustained period
of practice in utilizing mindfulness techniques. Thus, a future study comparing
naive with experienced meditators could shed light on this issue.
Limitations
The present study must be considered within the context of at least five limita-
tions. First, the study may have suffered from a small sample size relative to the
size of the effect that was observed, resulting in a lack of statistical significance
for an effect that may be deemed noteworthy. The present sample size was
chosen based on a power analysis using a medium effect size, which is what
was achieved when comparing the mindfulness group to the worry group, but
not when comparing the mindfulness to the mind-wandering group.
Approximately 20 to 27 individuals were included in each condition across all
statistical analyses, with one isolated incident in which only 19 participants in
the mindfulness condition could be included in the word fragment task analyses
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due to participant error in completing the task which rendered some data
unusable. By way of contrast, recent studies by Niemiec et al. (2010)
utilized sample sizes of sometimes over 200 participants, split up across 2 to
4 groups. These sample sizes occasionally surpassed the necessary number of
participants to achieve significance given his achieved effect sizes—for example,
Niemiec’s study utilizing the MSTS, with a sample size of 128, reported signifi-
cant absolute value b coefficients of between .18 and .28. Replications of the
present study should strive to attain large sample sizes so as to increase statistical
power.
Second, as stated before, the MSTS may not have been the optimal means of
investigating distal defense responses to the mortality salience induction. Unlike
the word fragment task, the MSTS has been utilized in comparatively few stu-
dies. A study by Niemiec et al. (2010) found no difference in MSTS scores
between mortality salient participants and neutral participants when partici-
pants were high in trait mindfulness but did find a difference in score when
participants were low in trait mindfulness. This indicates that MSTS score
may be moderated by trait mindfulness. Accordingly, it may be that trait mind-
fulness has a greater effect on MSTS score than a brief mindfulness induction
may be able to achieve. The series of studies which originally proposed use of the
measure (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997) was conducted using a larger set of items
than the present study and utilized a sample of notably different culture, ethni-
city, and nationality. Thus, the evidence garnered from the present study’s ana-
lysis using the MSTS may be of limited use.
Third, it is worth noting that, because the PANAS was not administered
between the experimental condition and the mortality salience induction, it is
difficult to ascertain the extent to which negative affect was changed by the
mortality salience induction itself versus the experimental condition inductions
themselves. Nonetheless, differences across groups on the word fragment task do
seem to indicate that the mortality salience induction had at least some lasting
effect.
Fourth, it is noteworthy that the sample used in the present study consisted of
predominately female participants. A total of 15 of the 77 participants were men,
and after assigning each of the 15 men to one of the three experimental condi-
tions, there were not enough men in the sample to reliably compare effects
between men and women. Because of the sample’s limited capacity to compare
effects by gender, it cannot be said with high confidence that the present study is
fully representative of both men and women.
Fifth, the sample used in the present study utilized convenience sampling
to obtain participants. Because all participants were self-selected volunteers,
it is possible that the present study was vulnerable to self-selection bias or
other influences beyond the control of the researchers. Use of more advanced
sampling techniques during data collection may mitigate these risks in future
research.
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Future Directions
Although the present study provides noteworthy evidence suggesting the effec-
tiveness of mindfulness over worry and perseveration when confronted with
death-related anxiety, the results provide no evidence that mindfulness yields
significant benefits when compared with simply distracting oneself from threa-
tening thoughts. The results of the present study are currently unclear as to
whether the lack of evidence supporting mindfulness’s superiority over mind-
wandering, particularly in the realm of diminishing and guarding against nega-
tive affect, was due to a true lack of difference between the two conditions or
whether a lack of statistical power could partially explain the lack of significant
results. This question is particularly interesting in light of research indicating
that mindfulness may be especially effective at reducing distracted and rumina-
tive thinking, indicating that the mindfulness and mind-wandering conditions,
while achieving similar results, may be doing so via differing pathways (Jain
et al., 2007). Therefore, future studies should utilize a larger sample size to
specifically investigate differences between mindfulness and neutral conditions
in the context of death-related anxiety.
It is plausible that some of the anxiety-reducing benefits generated by the
mindfulness induction were secondary to the relaxation response (Benson,
1975). Given the similarity between mindfulness meditation and relaxation train-
ing, it is recommended that future studies compare these two techniques directly.
While the results of this comparison are as yet unclear, it is likely that one would
see some notable improvement in negative affect among members of a
‘‘relaxation condition,’’ given research indicating the efficacy of relaxation tech-
niques in reducing anxiety (Luebbert, Dahme, & Hasenburg, 2001; Wallace,
Benson, & Wilson, 1984).
One potentially fruitful question for future research is whether a stronger
effect might be found if the mortality salience induction preceded the experi-
mental manipulation. The effects of the mindfulness condition, presented imme-
diately after the mortality salience condition, may more effectively counteract
anxiety instilled by the mortality salience induction than in the present study.
Conversely, the present study sought only to buffer the effects of mortality
salience. A future study in which the order of the mortality salience induction
and the experimental manipulation were reversed may compare the effect of
utilizing mindfulness skills in response to distressing stimuli versus prior to
distressing stimuli. Such an approach would examine the capacity for mindful-
ness to ‘‘undo’’ the negative effects of mortality salience, similar to the ability of
positive emotions to undo the negative effects of negative emotions
(Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000)
A few noteworthy correlations between trait mindfulness and the other
dependent variables were also found by the present study. In particular, trait
mindfulness was highly negatively correlated with number of death-related
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words completed on the word fragment task, indicating that mindfulness as a
personality trait may play a significant part in modifying internalized defense
mechanisms in response to mortality salience. Likewise, trait mindfulness was
highly negatively correlated with negative affect at both time points after the
mortality salience induction, also indicating that mindfulness as a personality
trait may similarly play a large part in buffering negative affective response to
stimuli which invoke death-related anxiety. It is worth reiterating that these
correlations were compared with the total sample, regardless of condition, indi-
cating that trait mindfulness may be a larger predictor of response to mortality
salience than individual approach to dealing with mortality salience (e.g., mind-
fulness, mind-wandering, and worrying) in certain contexts. Such findings
appear commensurate with prior research which indicates that higher levels of
mindfulness are associated with lower levels of anxiety (Chambers et al., 2009).
Research by Niemiec et al. (2010) found a significant interaction between trait
mindfulness and experimental condition when measuring MSTS scores across
participants who had undergone a mortality salience induction and those in a
control group. Given the correlational significance of trait mindfulness as it
pertains to the present study, the field would benefit from future studies exam-
ining the extent to which trait mindfulness may moderate the effect of the
experimental manipulation.
As stated earlier, mindfulness skills must be diligently practiced over an
extended period of time in order to build enough skill to exact maximum benefit.
The present study utilized inexperienced undergraduate students with no pre-
vious training in mindfulness skills. It is possible that the mindfulness condition
would yield larger effects if it utilized participants who practiced mindfulness
skills regularly or had received formal training. A study in which inexperienced
participants regularly practiced mindfulness skills may find more profound
changes in response to mortality salience when comparing defensive responses
and negative affect over multiple time points. Likewise, a study which exclusively
utilized experienced meditators as participants may yield larger effects than the
present study, which was limited to individuals with no prior experience or
training in mindfulness skills.
Future research, including replications of the present study, should include a
sample of men great enough to conduct reliable analysis of effects by gender as
well as by experimental condition. Utilization of a sample with a significant male
demographic will allow investigation into the extent to which the present results
are representative of both men and women.
Conclusions
The present study sought to examine the effect of a brief mindfulness induction
on responses to mortality salience. By administering a mortality salience induc-
tion after the mindfulness induction, participants’ responses to mortality
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salience could be measured in the context of whether they had received a mind-
fulness induction or other experimental treatment (mind-wandering and worry-
ing). Results indicate that mind-wandering and mindfulness are both superior to
worry and perseveration in guarding against negative affect as well as in dimin-
ishing proximal defense mechanisms in response to mortality salience. Results
were insufficient to conclude, however, that mindfulness is a superior approach
to simple distraction when confronted with death-related anxiety. With that in
mind, some preliminary data point toward possible future demonstration of the
superior efficacy of mindfulness in dealing with these difficult thoughts, given
enough statistical power. Correlations examined during the course of the study
also indicate that trait mindfulness may be a significant predictor of individual
responses to mortality salience, and future research should examine the extent to
which trait mindfulness versus behavioral response to mortality salience affects
final outcomes.
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